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I. INTRODUCTION
Modem economies are dependent upon the resources and capital of
foreign nations to remain competitive. The United States has long been a
world leader in developing and encouraging open foreign investment
policies aimed at enhancing the feasibility of cross-border deals and the
advancement of domestic opportunities. With national security a primary
concern of the U.S. government, balancing the interests of the national
economy with those of national security has been a fundamental challenge.
This challenge has only been heightened with the post-September 11
conception of national security needs.
This Note addresses the transformation of foreign direct investment in
the United States in light of heightened national security standards since the
September 11, 2001 attacks and highlights the treatment of three cross-
border deals that made U.S. government officials question the thoroughness
of foreign investment review policies. Despite the enactment of stricter
guidelines in the review of foreign investment transactions, Congress must
reexamine the extent of its influence in the process to ensure the retention
of open and consistent foreign investment policies in the United States
while preserving the best interests of those within its borders.
In Section II, this Note discusses the history of globalization and
foreign direct investment, their development as staples of the U.S.
economy, and the perceived advantages and disadvantages of global trade
liberalization on the U.S. economy and national security standards. Section
III provides an overview of the history and development of foreign direct
* Joint Juris Doctorate & Masters in Business Administration Candidate, 2009, Northwestern
University School of Law & Kellogg School of Management.
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investment in the United States and the various means of regulation that
have been imposed in attempts to monitor cross-border transactions.
Section IV discusses recent landmark cross-border deals that have shaped
the current state of U.S. foreign investment law. Section'V suggests the
possible implications of current law on the future of foreign investment and
trade in the United States. Finally, Section VI provides recommendations
to improve foreign direct investment controls in the United States in order
to maximize domestic economic benefits while minimizing national
security risks.
II. GLOBALIZATION, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES
Globalization provides individual national economies the means to
create economic webs with other countries through the integration of
markets and the unification of transportation and communication systems.'
This process has effects on culture, political systems, economic
development, and prosperity in societies around the world. Though
globalization and cross-border trade are not new and have in fact been
prevalent characteristics of functional societies for thousands of years, the
development of technology and social policies has increased the magnitude
and breadth of foreign trade and investment, causing new economies to be
opened both domestically and internationally by improved investments.
Advances in technology have provided new methods for consumers and
businesses alike to identify and measure economic trends and to pursue new
economic opportunities. Similarly, governments have negotiated reductions
in barriers to commerce, taking advantage of new opportunities in the
global marketplace and promoting international industrial and financial
business models.
Through its development as a societal norm, globalization has allowed
many poor countries and their citizens to develop economically and to raise
their standards of living. It has "enlarg[ed] the world economy,
promot[ing] technological innovations, foster[ing] universal political
participation, and enhanc[ing] international cooperation."2  Further,
globalization has provided a means for diverting human capital into more
high-skilled jobs, while simultaneously increasing global cooperation and
access to global resources.
Recognizing these numerous benefits, the United States has
Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The
Challenge ofMaintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 L.
& Bus. REV. AM. 381, 382 (2007).
2 Id. at 383 (quoting Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terrorism,
and the Movement of People, 36 INT'L LAW. 91, 92 (2002)).
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historically taken a liberal policy toward foreign direct investment.
3
President Reagan is credited with shaping U.S. policy by emphasizing the
domestic benefits of foreign investment with three policy objectives: "(1)
liberalization of barriers and the reduction of distortion of international
investments abroad, (2) encouragement of a greater role for private foreign
investment in the economic development of less-developed countries, and
(3) maintenance of the maximum degree of foreign investment openness for
the United States economy." 4 This aggressive approach towards foreign
direct investment increased the appeal of the United States to foreign
investors, thereby "entic[ing] foreign capital to the United States by
highlighting the benefits [the United States] provides to foreign investors."5
As a result, the United States has led the revolution toward globalization
and the free movement of capital.6  The resulting domestic benefits of
foreign investment have been plentiful: foreign capital has rescued many
ailing U.S. companies, real estate values have been heightened, the pool of
venture capital has increased, and local economies have been improved.7
Increased foreign investment adds to the gross domestic product,
simultaneously increasing the demand for U.S. labor and increasing the
domestic standard of living.
8
Despite the advantages globalization and foreign investment offer,
their potential harmful impact on the economy and potential threat to
national security standards are two of the most prevalent and argued
disadvantages. From an economic perspective, foreign direct investment
increases the number of acquisitions by foreign investors, which serves to
transfer assets to an individual or company that answers to a foreign
government. Critics argue that this adds nothing to U.S. productive
capacity at the expense of economic security since an increased portion of
domestic assets is in foreign control. 9 Further, critics cite that increased
foreign investment and globalization entice foreign governments to use
political influence to their advantage, weakening U.S. economic and social
3 Foreign direct investment is defined as: "ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by
one foreign person of ten per centum or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S.
business enterprise or an equivalent in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including
a branch." 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (1993).
4 Terry R. Spencer & Christian B. Green, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: An
Analysis of Its Potential Costs and Benefits and a Review of Legislative Tools Available to
Shape Its Future Course, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 539, 543 (1993).
5 Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional
Involvement Is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REv. 325, 329 (2007).
6 Id. at 330.
7 Id. at 331.
8 Spencer & Green, supra note 4, at 556.
9 Id. at 552.
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structures. 10
Foreign direct investment and globalization also impact national
security. Increased trade and a more open, continuous flow of human
capital increase opportunities for crime by facilitating the opportunity for
unethical and illegal practices to operate in a fairly unregulated
environment. In this sense, globalization has the potential to "facilitate
terrorism and impede anti-terrorism efforts 'by making the movement of
people and funds much easier.' 1 1
Balancing the desire for trade liberalization with national security
concerns has proven to be a challenge for many nations. In the United
States, transactions threatening national security include those that
"compromise the strength and independence of defense contractors, impact
U.S. leadership in technological areas, or affect important and strategic
natural resources." 12 The prevalence of global economic considerations in
almost all domestic operations necessitates the consideration of potential
foreign investments in national security issues. Globalization increases the
opportunities for malicious and illegitimate foreign investments as well as
large mergers and acquisitions-"foreign ownership of an American
corporation provides a presence for that parent corporation's country in the
United States."' 13 Foreign ownership is of particular concern to national
security if the purchasing country's interests are different from those of the
United States. In order to limit the opportunities for malicious foreign
investment, it is imperative for government controls to be in place to review
transactions, maintain domestic safety, and ensure that the United States
does not tolerate national security concerns as a tradeoff for enhanced
domestic and global economic development.
III. HISTORY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ITS
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has enjoyed a long history of foreign investment,
with foreign investors encouraged to participate in trade agreements with
the United States since the Louisiana Purchase and widespread
industrialization in the 1800s.' 4  Foreign investment has played an
important role in the development of the national economy, but foreign
imports have historically been perceived as a threat to the U.S. economy.
As cross-border trade became more of a staple in domestic economic
10 Id.
11 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 384 (quoting Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva,
Globalization, Terrorism, and the Movement of People, 36 INT'L LAW. 91, 93 (2002)).
12 Stagg, supra note 5, at 332.
13 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 384.
14 Paul I. Djurisic, The Exon-Florio Amendment: National Security Legislation
Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 179, 180 (1991).
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transactions, trade acts were amended to include both economic protection
and national security concerns. In the 1970s, largely due to the decreased
value of the U.S. dollar in relation to foreign currencies, foreign investment
in the United States increased. As a result, Congress passed the Foreign
Investment Study Act of 1974 (Study Act), "requiring the Secretaries of
Treasury and Commerce to conduct a comprehensive review of foreign
investment in the United States."' 15 The Study Act, through its mandated
review of U.S. foreign investment policy, led the government to conclude
that "the United States did not maintain an adequate mechanism for
monitoring foreign investments." 16
In 1975, as an extension of the Study Act and in response to
congressional concern that there lacked a strong mechanism to execute
comprehensive reviews, President Ford created the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The CFIUS had "primary
continuing responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the
impact of foreign investment in the United States ... and for coordinating
the implementation of United States Policy on such investment." 17 At the
time of its creation, the CFIUS did not have substantial authority to regulate
or prohibit those foreign investments that raised national security concerns.
The CFIUS's only power was to monitor investments and request foreign
governments to file preliminary reports regarding their foreign investment
activities. 18  With even less control over private foreign investors, the
CFIUS was often referred to as "one of Washington's legions of
interagency committees, as toothless and obscure as any."' 19 However, as
foreign investment opportunities became more complex, the need to
increase the responsibilities and standards of the CFIUS became of
paramount concern.
A. The CFIUS, Exon-Florio, and the Review Process
Since its creation in 1975, membership of the CFIUS has expanded
three times and it now comprises representatives of twelve U.S. government
agencies and departments.20 The Departments of the Treasury, Homeland
Security, Commerce, and Justice usually take the most active roles in the
CFIUS review process, with the staff of the Office of International
15 Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National
Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 588-89 (2007).
16 Djurisic, supra note 14, at 182.
17 Mostaghel, supra note 15, at 589.
18 Djurisic, supra note 14, at 183.
19 Id. (quoting Leah J. Nathans, Meet Wall Street's New Bugaboo: CFIUS, Bus. WK.,
June 12, 1989, at 90).
20 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 391.
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Investment of the Department of the Treasury administering the review.21
The Department of Defense, with its expertise in national security standards
and concerns, has been a particularly influential member of the CFIUS,
with the CFIUS often deferring to it when evaluating a proposed
transaction's national security implications.
22
The CFIUS is responsible for reviewing the national security
implications of foreign investments in the United States, without a focus on
political considerations. It seeks to carry out domestic investment policy
through "reviews that protect national security while maintaining the
credibility of [U.S.] open investment policy and preserving the confidence
of foreign investors here and of U.S. investors abroad that they will not be
subject to retaliatory discrimination.,
23
The CFIUS gets much of its authority through the Exon-Florio Act of
1988 (Exon-Florio), which was enacted in response to the attempted
acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation (a U.S. company) by
the Fujitsu Corporation (a Japanese company).24 The attempted acquisition
was perceived by the U.S. government as an attempt by Japanese
companies to "dominate the world semiconductor market" and as a threat to
21both U.S. companies in the semiconductor industry and national security.
Although Fujitsu's acquisition fell through, Congress recognized that there
was no legislation in place permitting the President to block such
transactions. 26 As a result, the Exon-Florio provision was enacted to allow
the President or his designee to "make an investigation to determine the
effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
proposed.., by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign
control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."
27
However, before the President can act, the CFIUS investigation "must
establish that the 'foreign interest exercising control might take action that
impairs the national security' and that no other provision of law could
adequately address the threat."
28
In carrying out its duties to monitor the impact of foreign investment
21 Ilene Knable Gotts, Leon B. Greenfield & Perry Lange, Is Your Cross-Border Deal the
Next National Security Lightning Rod?, Bus. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2007, at 31, 32.
22 Stagg, supra note 5, at 341.
23 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 392 (quoting the U.S. Treasury - Committee on Foreign
Investments in the United States (CFIUS), http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-
affairs/cfius (last visited. Apr. 1, 2009)).
24 Stagg, supra note 5, at 335.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 388-89 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)).
28 Stagg, supra note 5, at 336 (quoting the U.S. Treasury-Committee on Foreign
Investments in the United States (CFUS), http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-
affairs/cfius (last visited Apr. 1, 2009)).
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on the United States, the CFIUS receives notices of proposed foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies, distributes the notices to CFIUS member
agencies, and coordinates reviews of the proposed deals. 29 After receiving
a notice of proposed acquisition, the CFIUS has thirty days to decide
whether to conduct a review, a decision that is based on whether the
proposed transaction adversely affects national security.3 ° If the CFIUS
determines during the thirty-day review that additional review is needed, it
may initiate a forty-five-day review. 31  If such an investigation is
conducted, a report must be presented to the President containing the
CFIUS's views regarding whether "there is credible evidence.., to believe
that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens
to impair the national security. ' 32 Once the CFIUS report has reached the
President, he has fifteen days to decide whether to (1) take no action; (2)
order divestiture if the transaction is already completed; or (3) block the
transaction.33  To block the transaction, the President must find "(1)
credible evidence that a transaction would impair national security and (2)
no other provision of law [that] grants him authority to take steps to
ameliorate [the potential national security] impact [of the transaction]. 34
The CFIUS review process operates through a system of voluntary
filings in which foreign entities interested in acquiring U.S. companies
notify the CFIUS of their interest prior to the completion of the
transaction. 5 The primary advantage of voluntarily submitting to review is
that the foreign company can obtain CFIUS clearance, meaning that there is36
less risk that the President will deny the transaction at a later date. The
filing must contain a description of the transaction, inclusive of timelines
and all assets to be acquired, as well as detailed backgrounds of all involved
parties. 37  In particular, "[f]or the target U.S. company, the filing must
identify... sensitive technologies or information it possesses and any U.S.
government contracts to which it is a party., 38 For the foreign investor, the
filing must include a report of future plans for the acquired firm and details
of the intended ownership structure.
39
Aside from reviewing voluntary filings, a member of the CFIUS can
29 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 391.
30 Id.
31 Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment:
Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 855 (2006).
32 Id. at 855-56 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)).
33 Id. at 856.
34 Gotts et al., supra note 21, at 32.
35 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 392.
36 Id.
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also request review of a transaction that has not been voluntarily reported to
the CFIUS by the parties. In this case, the parties are notified of the review
and asked to submit the appropriate and required information. 40  For
transactions that raise concerns, all parties engage in pre-filing consultations
with the CFIUS, to modify the intended transaction as necessary.4 1 The
CFIUS often focuses on transactions where the target U.S. company has
export-controlled technologies, technologies critical to national defense, or
when the CFIUS has "derogatory intelligence" about the foreign investor.42
The CFIUS also reviews transactions that may result in an absence of U.S.-
controlled companies supplying technology or products that are critical to
national security.43
B. Critiques of the CFIUS and Exon-Florio
From the time of Exon-Florio's 1988 enactment to 1999, the CFIUS
only investigated approximately seventeen out of 1300 voluntary reports
and of those seventeen, seven were voluntarily withdrawn.44 In fact, only
one divestiture of a foreign investment was issued in the era of Exon-Florio
and the CFIUS: a 1990 case involving the acquisition of a U.S. aerospace
manufacturer by a Chinese firm.45
As a result of the low and inconclusive statistics concerning their
usefulness, both Exon-Florio and the CFIUS have been criticized for their
effectiveness in regulating foreign investments in the United States. A
leading criticism of Exon-Florio is that "national security" is never defined,
which allows for a case-by-case determination of whether a transaction
poses a threat to national security.46 This could result in many varied
interpretations of the national security standard, possibly dissuading foreign
investors from investing in the United States and instead choosing other
countries where the regulations are less ambiguous.
In terms of the CFIUS, critics have argued that it has carried out its
duties in a "'nonchalant' and 'cavalier' fashion because of its focus upon
specific transactions only, rather than on the synergistic and cumulative
effect that multiple transactions will have on the nation's defense industrial
base., 47 Others contest the nature of the CFIUS review process, arguing
that it lacks the necessary transparency for effective oversight and the
40 Byrne, supra note 31, at 855.
41 Gotts et al., supra note 21, at 33.
42 Id. at 32.
43 Id.
44 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 392-93.
45 Gotts et al., supra note 21, at 33.
46 Stagg, supra note 5, at 336.
47 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 393.
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accountability needed to be taken seriously. 48 However, those in favor of
the CFIUS recognize its position as a means for the federal government to
monitor and restructure foreign investment transactions, noting that the
"CFIUS enhances the national security when it identifies specific problems
which could threaten U.S. security and helps resolve these problems while
still allowing U.S. businesses to receive the capital they need.",49 In this
regard, the jury is still out on the effectiveness of the CFIUS, which
contributed in part to the decision to reorganize and amend its review
process and power.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
LAW
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, national security
standards were heightened and foreign transactions have since been viewed
with greater scrutiny. A primary theme in U.S. government discussions
post-September 11 has been the necessity and urgency for the United States
to take a stronger defensive position, with border security becoming a "top
priority." 50 The CFIUS responded to the threat of terrorism by tightening
the requirements for approval of foreign acquisitions and adding the
Department of Homeland Security to its membership in 2003."' In light of
these tougher requirements for foreign transaction approval, one of the most
significant obstacles in the quest to improve border security has been
achieving a balance between increasing attention paid to national security
issues and maintaining the freedom of foreign investment and trade without
reductions or delays, a balance paramount to the nation's continued
economic success. In the past decade, there have been several controversial
transactions that have increased the number of foreign investment
transactions deemed problematic and that have raised concerns over the
quality of foreign direct investment regulations.
A. China National Offshore Oil Corporation's Acquisition of Unocal
(2005)
On April 4, 2005, California-based oil and natural gas company
Chevron Corporation (Chevron) announced its intention to acquire another
California-based company, Unocal Corporation (Unocal).52 Following
48 Id. at 394.
49 Id. at 395.
50 Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the
Forward Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44 Hous. L. REV. 189, 200-01 (2007).
51 Stagg, supra note 5, at 342.
52 Gaurav Sud, From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS: Finding a Balance in U.S.
Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1303, 1304 (2006).
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antitrust approval from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, negotiations
proceeded smoothly until China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) made an unsolicited $18.5 billion bid for Unocal on June 23,
2005 that topped Chevron's bid.5 3 "CNOOC was created by the Chinese
government 'in 1982 to be a joint venture partner with foreign oil
companies exploring for offshore oil reserves"' and was considered to be
one of the top fifty state-owned companies in China.54 Despite potential
advantages of the acquisition, Congress was wary of national security issues
arising from a foreign company taking control of a domestic company in
the energy market. 55 This concern stemmed from, among other reasons, the
generous loans that CNOOC was receiving from state-owned banks and
from its parent company, China National Offshore Oil, to fund its bid,
which many viewed as "an effort by the Chinese government to overtake a
private American oil company, rather than a pure commercial
transaction., 56 On June 24, 2005, forty-one members of Congress sent a
letter urging a thorough CFIUS review of the deal, stating, "energy security
is a matter of significant and increasing importance for the [United States]"
and that there was concern "about China's ongoing and proposed
acquisition of energy assets around the world, including those in the
[United States]." 57 In House Resolution 344, the House of Representatives
recognized that the transaction "would result in Unocal's strategic assets...
being preferentially allocated to China by the Chinese government, which
would weaken U.S. ability.., to influence the oil and gas supplies of the
Nation through companies that must adhere to [U.S.] laws., 58 Further, the
transaction would not only transfer significant natural resources from the
United States to China but also create the possibility for certain
technologies to be exported to China. 59 The Resolution cited concerns that
through the acquisition of Unocal, CNOOC could take actions that would
threaten the national security of the United States. This concern was
echoed by the Armed Services Committee, which concluded in its own
investigation in July 2005 that the concern lay not only in the United States'
future access to oil but also in the idea that Communist China could control
a U.S. corporation that dealt in a strategic natural resource."
In order to allay the evident political and economic concerns, CNOOC
53 Id.
54 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 403 (citation omitted).
55 Sud, supra note 52, at 1305.
56 Joshua W. Casselman, China 's Latest 'Threat' to the United States: The Failed
CNOOC-Unocal Merger and Its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS, 17 IND. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 155, 162 (2007).
57 Mamounas, supra note 1, at 404.
58 Id. at 405.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 406.
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agreed to undergo a voluntary review by the CFIUS to "stress the key
commitments that are an integral part of the friendly and open offer for
Unocal.", 61 Despite its offer for voluntary review, political pressure and
regulatory risk continued to rise, ultimately resulting in CNOOC's
withdrawal of its offer for Unocal, citing "unprecedented political
oppression. ', 62 Unocal shareholders ultimately voted to accept Chevron's
bid.
The result of this failed transaction was worldwide doubt of the
viability of foreign investments in the United States. CNOOC vocally
demonstrated its efforts and desire to make the deal work, stating, "CNOOC
has given active consideration to further improving the terms of its offer,
and would have done so but for the political environment in the U.S."'63 For
the United States, Unocal may have been able to benefit from a potentially
more lucrative deal with CNOOC and the assets underlying exposure to the
Chinese market. The failed transaction signaled to foreign investors that
they should expect similar scrutinizing treatment when dealing with
strategic assets and raised questions over the potential of China's future
interest in investing in the United States.
B. Dubai Ports World's Acquisition of Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company (2005)
Shortly after the CNOOC-Unocal transaction fell through, Congress
faced another challenge in balancing national security concerns with foreign
investment transactions in the United States. Dubai Ports World, "a state-
owned company located in the United Arab Emirates," entered into an
agreement to acquire London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company (P&O), which ran port operations at six U.S. ports.
64
In October 2005, the two companies informally requested voluntary review
by the CFIUS. 65  Nearly two months before the companies had the
opportunity to formally file a request for review, the CFIUS requested an
intelligence assessment of Dubai Ports World, which showed that the
foreign acquirer had neither the intention nor the capability to threaten U.S.
national security. 66  On December 16, 2005, the companies filed their
formal notices with the CFIUS requesting a review, launching the thirty-day
61 Sud, supra note 52, at 1305.
62 Id. at 1306.
63 Id.
64 Mostaghel, supra note 15, at 606.
65 Id.
66 Press Release, Dep't of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National
Security in the Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ s4071.htm.
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formal review on December 17.67 On January 17, 2006, the CFIUS agreed
to allow the transaction to take place.
Approval of the transaction concerned many members of Congress
who believed that in approving the purchase the government neglected
national security considerations. Critics expressed concern over Dubai
Ports World's acquisition, fearing that its control over domestic port
operations posed a national security risk particularly because of "the UAE's
history as an operational and financial base for the hijackers who carried out
the September 11, 2001, attacks., 68 As a result, critics argued that a UAE-
owned company could not be trusted with port security. In response to the
widespread concern and doubt over the decision to approve the transaction,
President Bush argued that "national security would not be harmed in any
way by the operation of [Dubai Ports World] within these U.S. ports" 69 and
that "the UAE could be trusted in this situation because it had provided
assistance to and cooperation with the United States in the War on
Terror.,
70
In the end, the critics' arguments were sufficient to raise congressional
concern and the House Appropriations Committee voted on March 8, 2006
to block the transfer of the port terminals to Dubai Ports World.7 The
foreign acquirer responded by announcing its intention to "transfer" the
U.S. terminal operation rights to a U.S. company.72 Although the critics
were appeased that the final decision took a more conservative angle, Dubai
Ports World heightened concerns over the substance and viability of the
CFIUS review process and raised questions over the need for enhanced
legislation to clarify the CFIUS's roles and powers.
C. Smartmatic's Acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems (2005)
Smartmatic, a privately-held software company ninety-seven percent
owned by four Venezuelan founders, won contracts from U.S. competitors
that allowed it to acquire Sequoia Voting Systems (SVS), a California-
based company providing voting equipment. 73 Smartmatic was a small
firm with li-tip pyn,-r'ppcp in "oting technology -t--i-t --.- a- '--""n b
Venezuelan authorities to replace the country's election machinery.
67 Id.
68 Mostaghel, supra note 15, at 606.
69 Byrne, supra note 31, at 878.
70 Id. at 879.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Shannon M. Haley, A Shot Across the Bow: Changing the Paradigm of Foreign Direct
Investment Review in the United States, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1157, 1167 (2007).
74 Tim Golden, U.S. Investigates Voting Machines' Venezuela Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2006, at 11.
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Seven months before the voting contract was awarded to Smartmatic, a
financing agency for the Venezuelan government invested in a smaller
technology company that was owned by some of the same people as
Smartmatic. 75 This resulted in the government agency receiving a twenty-
eight percent stake in the smaller company, raising concern that the
Venezuelan government may be able to hold influence over U.S. elections
because of its connections to Smartmatic.76  U.S. government
representatives pushed for review of the Smartmatic-SVS acquisition, citing
the importance of the government knowing who owns the voting machines.
Despite public statements from Smartmatic's spokesman citing the
transparency associated with Smartmatic's ownership and the certification
by federal and state election agencies of SVS's electronic voting systems,
U.S. government officials were still concerned that potential Venezuelan
influence in U.S. voting systems presented a significant national security
issue. 
77
On October 26, 2006, Smartmatic and SVS issued a press release
announcing they voluntarily filed for review with the CFIUS. However,
before review had been completed, Smartmatic withdrew from the review
process and announced its plans to sell SVS. 7 9 Despite the resolution of the
immediate national security issue, there remained a general air of concern
that the CFIUS was not well-prepared to investigate and report on the
breadth and complexity of potential foreign investment issues.
D. Invest in America Initiative
On May 10, 2007, in light of these transactions and overarching
concern over the sufficiency of foreign investment review and in an effort
to express continued support for foreign direct investment in the United
States, President Bush issued a statement reaffirming domestic commitment
to advance open economies, open investment, and trade. It stated, "the
United States unequivocally supports international investment in this
country and is equally committed to securing fair, equitable, and
nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. investors abroad. ' ' 80 President Bush
committed to ensuring that the United States remains the premier global
investment locale and to advancing free and fair trade.
81
One proposal to further foreign interest in investing in the United
75 Id.
76 Haley, supra note 73, at 1168.
77 Golden, supra note 74.
78 Haley, supra note 73, at 1168.
79 Id. at 1169.
80 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES-JAPAN INVESTMENT INITIATIVE 2007 REPORT 12
(June 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86189.pdf.
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States was the Department of Commerce's "Invest in America" initiative.
The goal of this initiative was to educate international investors on the
advantages of investing in the United States, focusing on outreach to
foreign governments and investors, state governments, and businesses.82
Through this initiative, the promotion of foreign direct investment in the
United States is anticipated to increase, thus contributing to U.S. job
creation and domestic competitiveness.
E. CFIUS Reform Legislation
Despite presidential support for foreign direct investment and the
optimism generated by the Invest in America initiative, following the
CNOOC-Unocal, Dubai Ports World-P&O, and Smartmatic-SVS
transactions, members of Congress questioned the effectiveness of the
CFIUS review process and Exon-Florio and demanded that more attention
be placed on national security. At the time of these transactions, the CFIUS
and Exon-Florio provided for a balance between national security and open
foreign investment, taking an aggressive stance to ensure national security
interests were preserved while open investment policies were still
maintained.8 3 However, the lack of a formal definition of national security
in Exon-Florio and the freedom of the CFIUS to negotiate agreements with
foreign firms without extensive oversight left many members of Congress
questioning the consistency of reviews performed.
With Congress' increased focus on the CFIUS process, in 2006 alone,
CFIUS launched seven forty-five-day investigations, which was the same
number it had initiated in the previous five years combined. 84 Although the
CFIUS was closely investigating many transactions that it may have
quickly reviewed in the past, Congress pushed to ensure that national
security issues continued to receive top priority in the review process. This
resulted in various proposed legislation aimed at redefining the roles of the
CFIUS and its review process.
1. National Security Foreign !nv.ntmont Rofr,.m nI .Strength-od
Transparency Act of2007
In February 2007, the House of Representatives passed the National
Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency Act of
2007 (the Act), the first major piece of legislation focused on the CFIUS
review process. 5 The Act proposed several changes to the CFIUS review
process, including: (1) "granting [the] CFIUS the option to extend the
82 Id. at 13.
83 Byrne, supra note 31, at 887.
84 Gotts et al., supra note 21, at 33.
85 Id. at 35.
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review and investigation periods" on a case-by-case basis; (2) "requiring
that an investigation of an acquisition by a government designated as a
sponsor of international terrorism [] not be closed absent the President's
approval;" and (3) "requiring [the] CFIUS ... to impose 'evergreen
provisions' allowing reviews to be reopened in certain circumstances." ' 6
2. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
On July 27, 2007, President Bush signed into law the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).87 Previously,
under Exon-Florio, the President had the authority to suspend, prohibit, or
seek to prevent a foreign merger with, acquisition of, or investment in a
U.S. business. As highlighted by cited complaints, such presidential action
rarely occurred because the CFIUS customarily resolved security issues
prior to presidential review. 88 To address these concerns, FINSA broadens
the authority of the CFIUS to cover infrastructure and technologies,
strengthens the CFIUS's review, and increases congressional oversight
throughout the process. 89 By requiring heightened transparency in the
review process, FINSA aims to monitor transactions between the CFIUS
and the parties to the agreement to ensure that all national security concerns
are properly addressed before a transaction is approved or dismissed.
Among other things, FINSA (1) "retains the current thirty-day window for
completion of the initial CFIUS review of a transaction," 90 (2) "retains the
current forty-five-day window for completion of a subsequent, second-level
investigation where national security issues have yet to be mitigated," 91 (3)
"increases transparency by requiring reports to Congress and the public on
completed reviews and investigations,' '92 and (4) "provides for civil
penalties if parties to a transaction violate FINSA provisions, including
mitigation agreements. 93
FINSA makes several improvements to the regulation of foreign direct
investment by clarifying some of the ambiguities in the CFIUS review
process. FINSA requires an initial review of all "covered transactions"
94
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87 Michael J. O'Neil, Did You Expect Less Scrutiny? After Dubai Ports World, Congress






93 O'Neil, supra note 87.
94 A covered transaction is "any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or
pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States." Foreign
Investment & National Security Act of 2007 § 2(a)(3) (2007).
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that either the CFIUS decides to investigate or of which the CFIUS receives
notification from the parties, ensuring that every transaction involving
foreign investment receives attention from the CFIUS. 95  To advise
transacting parties about the threshold of risk deemed acceptable by the
CFIUS, FINSA requires that the CFIUS "issue guidance on the types of
transactions previously reviewed that presented national security and
critical infrastructure concerns. 9 6  Further, in order to ensure the
fulfillment of agreements or conditions issued by the CFIUS to transacting
parties, CFIUS is required by FINSA to designate an agency to monitor the
parties' actions following the acquisition. 97 The CFIUS must also provide
reports to Congress before July 31 of each year discussing all CFIUS
reviews and investigations, including information on the types of
transactions approved, statistics on the number of withdrawals, and
information on the effects of monitoring arrangements designed to mitigate
national security concerns. 98 All withdrawals from voluntary review must
be approved and documented by the CFIUS to ensure proper due diligence
by the transacting parties prior to committing to review. 99
Perhaps most significantly, FINSA codifies the CFIUS and establishes
it as "the President's designee for purposes of Exon-Florio." 100  This
statutory basis for the CFIUS stabilizes the review process by firmly
establishing the CFIUS's members and their roles in implementing Exon-
Florio and legitimizing the CFIUS's authority within the U.S. regulatory
scheme.101 By heightening the required scrutiny applied to the transactions
reviewed by the CFIUS and by increasing the oversight by Congress,
FINSA serves to increase the CFIUS's due diligence concerns and to
enhance the monitoring of national security issues.
Despite the numerous advantages FINSA brings to foreign investment
regulation, critics cite ways in which it threatens to negatively impact the
U.S. economy and national security. By increasing congressional reporting
requirements, it is argued that FINSA politicizes the foreign direct
investment process.10 2  Many members of Congress, once obtaining
necessary security clearance, are granted access to confidential information
pertaining to toreign investment transactions that have undergone CFIUS
review. In addition, state senators with the necessary security clearance are
allowed access to information about transactions involving companies that
95 Stagg, supra note 5, at 346.
96 O'Neil, supra note 87.
97 Stagg, supra note 5, at 345.
98 O'Neil, supra note 87.
99 Id.
100 Stagg, supra note 5, at 346.
101 Id. at 351.
1o2 Id. at 352.
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have a principal place of business in their respective state. 103 By allowing
so many individuals access to this confidential information, there is the
potential for foreign investment transactions to be used for political
purposes, with special-interest groups gaining influence over the review
process. 104 With increased congressional involvement in the CFIUS review
process, there is an increased likelihood of pressure from both domestic
competitors and target managers to propel, delay, or prevent certain
proposed foreign acquisitions, which runs contrary to the intended purpose
of foreign direct investment review. 105
Aside from politicizing foreign investment transactions, there is also
concern with the increased transparency and lack of confidentiality
demanded by FINSA's new requirements. Critics contend that "FINSA
compromises information sensitive to both national security and corporate
competitiveness by allowing disclosure to more individuals than necessary
to adequately investigate the transaction's national-security
implications."10 6 Despite assurances of confidentiality inherent in FINSA,
the access of confidential information by a large number of people has the
potential to discourage foreign investors from seeking investment and
acquisition opportunities in the United States.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AND CROSS-BORDER DEALS IN THE UNITED STATES
It is undisputed that foreign investments and acquisitions in the United
States have the potential to benefit the domestic economy, yet national
security concerns over the increased opportunities for espionage and
technology disruptions are paramount. In an effort to mitigate these
concerns, regulations such as FINSA ensure that cross-border deals will be
more heavily scrutinized prior to approval or dismissal. Undoubtedly, these
heightened standards will affect the way in which foreign investment
transactions take place.
For foreign acquiring companies, the reformed CFIUS review process
has several implications. First, investors need to consider the additional
time and risk of security reviews. These factors could prove to be a
deterrent to potential investors who will not welcome the intense scrutiny
and lengthy process necessary to begin finalizing their agreements. Second,
foreign investors need to consider the costs and burdens associated with the
CFIUS review process. There is a necessary expense and burden in
103 Id.
4 Id. at 353.
105 Susan W. Liebeler & William H. Lash III, Exon-Florio: Harbinger of Economic
Nationalism?, 16 CATO REV. Bus. & Gov'T. 44 (2008), available at http://www.cato.org
/pubs/regulation/regvl 6n 1/vl 6n 1-6.pdf
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generating the required information for the filings as well as the risk that the
filing will raise issues that might have otherwise gone unnoticed." 7
Further, foreign investors need to consider concessions the CFIUS might
require in order to approve the transaction. In past transactions,
concessions have included, divesting from subsidiaries with sensitive
technology and entering agreements concerning network security or
government access to critical infrastructure.10 8 Third, competing bidders
for domestic acquisitions may use the CFIUS review process to their
advantage by manipulating the system and making unsolicited or hostile
bids. The existence of actual or potential investors who do not raise Exon-
Florio or CFIUS issues may result in those investors paying a risk premium
to compensate the target U.S. firm for the risk. 109 Investors who understand
the review process may be able to make lower bids for acquisitions
recognizing that they will get approved and potential competitors will not
get approved for the transaction. In the case of hostile or unsolicited bids,
foreign investors may try to use the CFIUS process to delay the closing of
the transaction or give the Committee unfavorable information to harm a
competitor and prevent the transaction from being approved." 0
Aside from the implications for foreign acquiring companies, there are
also implications for businesses in the United States. Recognizing the
importance of foreign direct investment on the U.S. economy, it is possible
that heightened review processes and intense scrutiny will have a negative
effect on domestic businesses by causing foreign investors to develop
dissuading perceptions of navigating national security standards in order to
complete transactions within the United States. Further, target firms in the
United States will need to take into account the additional time and risk
associated with national security reviews in their own business decisions.
Finally, it is possible that investors may change their own investment laws
in an effort to circumvent national security requirements. Among other
countries, Canada, China, and Thailand have all passed legislation creating
new rules for foreign direct investments, including new screening
requirements and reporting regimes."' The combination of these factors
Woulu pluvo doirimnentai not oniy to the newiy issueo regulations but also to
efforts at taking advantage of globalization opportunities.
Despite the heightened review process requirements, there remains the
threat of numerous risks for U.S. businesses pertaining to foreign
investments. The increased scrutiny by the CFIUS will likely result in
increased congressional comfort with foreign investment decisions. The
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future of foreign direct investment in the United States is dependent on the
creation of a balance between the short-term necessity for foreign investors
to overcome heightened security standards and the long-term benefit of
transparency in the CFIUS review process to ease concerns and encourage
continued cross-border deals.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES
Globalization and foreign investment are inescapable as mechanisms
upon which the U.S. economy heavily depends. However, proposed
transactions such as CNOOC-Unocal, Dubai Ports World-P&O, and
Smartmatic-SVS highlight the necessity to balance national security needs
and public and congressional concerns with the importance of domestic
economic growth and development. The revised CFIUS review process
under FINSA suggests the importance that the U.S. government places on
foreign investments in the United States and the recognition of the
significant economic benefits they afford. However, in order for the
reformed legislation to be effective and appease the concerns associated
with foreign investment deals in the past, Congress must ensure that it is not
demanding adherence to a review process that is overly transparent or
highly politicized.
In order to effectively encourage foreign direct investment and enforce
national security standards, it is necessary for Congress to institute
restrictions on the individuals who have access to confidential information
about potential foreign investment transactions. The superfluous supply of
corporate information and details surrounding foreign deals serves as a
significant deterrent to potential investors overseas as well as to potential
domestic target companies. By granting access to such information, FINSA
enables mischief by special-interest groups that encourage their
congressional constituents to thwart or delay the review or approval
process. "12
While it is necessary to provide a level of congressional involvement
in the CFIUS review process, FINSA exaggerates this transparency and
simultaneously risks losing foreign investments through current regulation.
Through means such as more thorough details in the CFIUS reports to
Congress, including the disclosure of the factors the CFIUS considers in
determining national security implications of potential transactions, 113
Congress could establish transparency without threatening the
confidentiality of corporate information or the politicizing of the CFIUS
review process.
112 Liebeler & Lash, supra note 105.
113 Stagg, supra note 5, at 358.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to the implementation of FINSA, the review process was
permissive, discretionary, and discreet in terms of reporting and
congressional notification requirements, suggesting that open investment
was deemed a more important and significant priority to the U.S.
government than national security standards. There was no firm stance on
whether the inquiry underlying the review and investigation by the CFIUS
would include consideration of the past conduct and future intentions of the
foreign investor or the national origin of the investment, unless there was
credible evidence of an impairment of national security."l 4 Further, the
three major foreign investment deals sparking interest in CFIUS reform
(CNOOC-Unocal, Dubai Ports World-P&O, and Smartmatic-SVS) provide
little basis for thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of prior law since all
three investors withdrew their bids prior to completion of the CFIUS review
process.
FINSA is a step in the right direction, adding some transparency and
more complexity to the foreign investment review process, with increased
scrutiny and a broader directive that will increase the number of
transactions considered by the CFIUS.1 5  Further, new congressional
oversight and additional press focusing on the new review process will add
to public consciousness of foreign acquisitions, making potential target
firms also more aware of the importance of the review process.' 16 Having
been only recently implemented, it will take time before the success of
congressional efforts at a heightened focus on national security interests
will be determined. Unquestionably, the reform legislation furthers the goal
of attaining the balance between the interests of the economy and those of
national security. However, too much transparency and access to
confidential information by too many individuals may prove to be a
significant detriment to foreign investment transactions unless FINSA is
properly amended to ensure the CFIUS review process continues
seamlessly.
With no significant foreign investment dpnl hvngncwne A ; the
implementation of FINSA and with the failure of CNOOC-Unocal, Dubai
Ports World-P&O, and Smartmatic-SVS, it is difficult to assess foreign
investors' interests in undergoing the critical review process and whether
these past deals will deter foreign companies from investing in the United
States. With foreign direct investment a critical component of the U.S.
economy and also a key factor in the expansion of many international
companies, it is likely that there will be many future investment
114 Haley, supra note 73, at 1173-74.
5 O'Neil, supra note 87.
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transactions. The reformed CFIUS review process under FINSA provides a
concrete measure for evaluating foreign investments and for ensuring that
the CFIUS will do its part to make certain that the U.S. government protects
not only trade but also national security. Execution of the review process
requires consideration of the best interests of both the foreign investors and
the domestic companies to make sure that a stronger national economy can
be built without sacrificing the confidentiality of corporate information.
This will ensure that the critical balance is maintained between the strong,
attentive enforcement of national security standards and the maintenance of
an open foreign investment policy.
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